Consequences for the MENA Region
On December 10th, 2020, the United
States announced that it would recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over
Western Sahara. This policy shift, a product of years of covert
diplomacy, was to be exchanged for Morocco’s ‘normalisation’ of
ties with Israel. This quid pro quo, a signature of the Trump
administration’s foreign policy, has far-reaching consequences that
will continue to unfold in Israel, Palestine, Morocco, and throughout
the MENA region. This policy outlook analyses some of the events that
led up to this announcement and aims to establish what this crucial
moment may mean for the future of Western Sahara, Morocco-Israel
relations, and the role of ‘normalisation’ as a tool in regional
diplomacy.
Background On December 10th, President
Donald Trump announced via Twitter that the United States publicly
supported the Kingdom of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.
In an age in which major moments in diplomacy are sometimes debuted
on social media, this public declaration still made waves in the
international diplomatic and media communities. Up until now,
Washington has remained decidedly silent on the status of Western
Sahara since the region became a disputed territory in 1975.
Moreover, President Trump’s remarks not only indicated that the
United States intended to back Morocco’s sovereignty over Western
Sahara but also shared that it had played a principal role in
re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel. At the
same time, the White House informed Congress of an upcoming $1
billion arms deal between the United States and the Kingdom, which
primarily focused on the purchase of drones and precision-guided
weapons.
Amid these rapid and public updates,
the governments of Morocco and Israel both scrambled to officially
comment on the changes to their relationship. While the two states
were not fully estranged, they had cut off public ties in 2000,
following the onset of the Second Intifada. On the same day as
President Trump’s Twitter announcement, the Moroccan Royal Cabinet
released an official statement outlining that “the two states will
resume partial diplomatic ties in the near future, establish direct
flights, and promote economic and technological cooperation”. While
the proclamation of official relations between Israel and Morocco, as
well as the update on Western Sahara, could be construed as being
hasty or even unclear — particularly for the citizens of Morocco —
the reality behind this geopolitical shift was anything but. Rather,
both the normalisation of relations and the American declaration of
support for Morocco in Western Sahara are a product of several years
of cautious and nuanced diplomacy carried out among a small group of
American, Moroccan, and Israeli leaders.
While Bolton is widely recognised as a
once highly influential figure within President Trump’s foreign
policy team, Senator Inhofe played the most influential role in
stalling these particular negotiations. At the time, the Republican
Senator from Oklahoma was a close ally of President Trump. Senator
Inhofe, who is also the ranking member of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, is well known on Capitol Hill as a vocal opponent of
Morocco’s claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Senator,
over the course of his career, has met with leaders from the Frente
Polisario in Algeria and developed a reputation as one of the few
adamant supporters of their movement from within the United States
government. As a result, Senator Inhofe, after gaining the support of
John Bolton, was successfully able to dissuade the President from
making this exchange.
This blockade in Morocco-Israel
‘normalisation’ negotiations appeared to be impenetrable until
December of 2020. As reported by the Washington Post and confirmed by
John Bolton himself in an article for Foreign Policy, the
normalisation negotiations were jumpstarted early last month when
Senator Inhofe and President Trump swiftly went from political allies
to opponents over a disagreement regarding the contents of the
National Defence Authorisation Act, a standard military funding bill.
Senator Inhofe apparently refused to include several articles in the
bill due to concerns that they were irrelevant to the overarching
purpose of the Act, which angered President Trump. This dividing of a
once-strong alliance represented a crucial opportunity for Kushner,
Berkowitz, and others, one that ultimately resulted in the President
signing off on the normalisation deal and announcing his support for
Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara within several days.
In response to the news of the treaty,
Foreign Minister Bourita, in an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth,
countered descriptions of the agreement as a ‘normalisation’ of
ties. He described the recent announcement as “re-formalising the
[existing] relations” between the two countries. Minister Bourita’s
remarks play into two talking points coming from the Moroccan
government. The first is, as Minister Bourita indicated, that Morocco
and Israel have always had a unique relationship, one that
distinguishes this recent announcement from the recent normalisation
of ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, or
Sudan. This relationship will be explored further throughout the
policy outlook. The second is that, largely because of this existing
nuanced dynamic between the two states, the recent announcement
represents a diplomatic victory for the Kingdom. While there have
been some details provided by the three parties with respect to the
specific obligations of the treaty, this agreement is largely vague
in nature. As Israel and Morocco already have existing relations
across a variety of sectors and industries, the Kingdom believes that
the changes they are expected to make in response to the announcement
will be minimal. At the same time, Morocco gains Washington’s
recognition of Western Sahara, a feat with potentially far-reaching
diplomatic and financial consequences. On top of that, the Kingdom
has secured a $1 billion arms deal from the United States, a
transaction that mirrors the exchange between Washington and the UAE
during their own normalisation of ties with Israel.
On the Israeli side, Prime Minister
Netanyahu, in a phone call with King Mohammed VI, reportedly quoted a
line from the film Casablanca, stating that “I think this is the
start of a beautiful friendship”. Israel has already sent
delegations to the Kingdom to further discuss the terms of the
agreement, particularly liaison offices and the launch of commercial
flights, and also appears to be in high spirits with regards to the
deal. However, many facets of this relationship are yet to be
determined. This policy outlook further analyses the Morocco-Israel
relationship and attempts to outline the potential consequences of
Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.
From Secrecy to Publicity: The
Israel-Morocco Security Relationship
While the novelty of full and official
diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel is notable, the two
states have a unique security partnership that has existed relatively
covertly for decades. As a report published through the Atlantic
Council indicates, “the Moroccan intelligence services have had an
unofficial relationship with Israel through its intelligence agency,
Mossad, for almost sixty years.” This relationship was not simply
nominal, nor one-sided: Israeli intelligence allegedly assisted in
organising the Moroccan intelligence services during the reign of the
late King Hassan II and supplied weapons and other surveillance
technologies to the Kingdom.
Years later, in 1965, Moroccan
intelligence services allowed Mossad to bug rooms in Casablanca in
which several Arab leaders were meeting. Shlomo Gazit, who later
became the chief of Israeli military intelligence, said in a 2016
interview that this action provided Mossad with major insight into
the plans of some of these leaders. Now, it is important not to
exaggerate the nature of the relationship between Mossad and Moroccan
intelligence, nor to suggest that Morocco is the only Arab nation to
engage in covert relations with Israel or its closest ally, the
United States. However, these examples do offer insight into the
reality that a somewhat consistent covert relationship has existed
between the two states for decades, and that Morocco has particularly
engaged in this complex dynamic in matters relating to Israel and
Palestine.
Normalisation, therefore, represents
less of a genesis of security ties between the two states, and more
of a moment of public acknowledgement of their past strategic
relationship, as well as a decision to shift some these future
exchanges into the public eye. There was subtle evidence of this
movement prior to the official announcement of ties: At the start of
2020, Morocco and Israel agreed to a $48 million arms deal that
included the sale of Israeli reconnaissance drones. While the two
states, like many in the region, have historically engaged in some
level of arms dealing, this deal was certainly large enough to stir
up media attention, particularly for the inclusion of drones in the
sale.
The Kingdom, which has always been a
strong advocate for the Palestinian cause, has used its covert
relationship with Israel in an effort to mitigate the conflict,
including an effort to facilitate peace between Egypt and Israel. The
United States’ role in this partnership is not a coincidence
either, as Washington has publicly close ties with Israel, a long
history of a strategic regional alliance with Morocco and has been a
facilitator of covert cooperation between the two states for decades.
Thus, the formalisation of diplomatic,
economic, and security ties between Morocco and Israel — with the
United States in the middle —has a well-documented precedent in the
security sphere.
However, King Mohammed VI and the
Moroccan leadership have been quick to assure the public that they
have not abandoned their support of the Palestinian people. In
contrast to the swift and all-encompassing public announcement of the
agreement from the United States, the Kingdom has issued a variety of
statements emphasising that there are still significant portions of
the deal that have yet to be fully fleshed out and that the agreement
stops short of full and close relations. For example, Morocco has
discussed opening up a liaison office in Israel and establishing
commercial flights, but, for now, has failed to go much further.
Moreover, following the normalisation announcement, King Mohammed VI
placed a call to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in which he
stated that “Morocco’s work to consolidate its sovereignty will
never be, neither today nor in the future, at the expense of the
Palestinian people’s struggle for their legitimate rights.” Most
importantly, King Mohammed VI has been adamant that the Moroccan
position on Palestine has not changed, and that it “continues to
support a two-state solution and to promote negotiations between both
sides that would lead to definitive peace.” The Kingdom also
continues to stand by the Arab League Initiative that was issued in
2002 and reiterated in both 2007 and 2017, which outlines a united
commitment across the Arab League to normalisation of ties with
Israel in exchange for the withdrawal from lands it had taken over
since 1967. Morocco’s Justice and Development Party has echoed the
King’s comments, reiterating that sovereignty over Western Sahara
was the focus of this deal, not the abandonment of the Palestinian
cause.
Morocco’s public portrayal of the
agreement showcases that, while Israel and Morocco have a long
history of security cooperation, this latest announcement is far more
complex than either the ‘going public’ of secret ties or drastic
shift in one of Morocco’s most defining policies. Rather, it marks
the beginning of a complex dynamic between the two states, the full
intentions of which either remain unclear or have yet to be made
fully public.
Palestine and Western Sahara
Amid global debate over what the
normalisation of ties between Morocco and Israel may mean for future
Morocco-Palestine relations, the Kingdom has insisted that the deal
is, in fact, primarily focused on securing American support of
Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. It is undeniable that the
United States’ recognition of Morocco’s claims to Western Sahara
is a major victory for the Kingdom. However, the nature of the quid
pro quo exchange of the establishment of official ties with Israel
for this recognition is less of a certainty. In other words, while
this transactional diplomacy has come to define the Trump
administration’s foreign policy, the trading of these two
particular policies has introduced a strange dichotomy in regional
relations. And while the actors most involved in the formation of
this agreement may have grown accustomed to this exchange over the
years it took to come to fruition, its sudden public announcement has
somewhat perplexed the Moroccan public.
The Moroccan public categorically
opposed the previous normalisation treaties between Israel and the
UAE and Bahrain. According to one study, only 9% of the surveyed
Moroccan public supported these deals. As previously mentioned,
Morocco and Israel’s previous relationship has involved extensive
cooperation in the security field for decades. While this
relationship has not always been publicised, it was also not a strict
secret. However, the attitudes of the public — which have always
mirrored the support of the Palestinian people vocalised by King
Mohammed VI — do not align with the historical security measures
taken by the Moroccan state. Nevertheless, popular opinion of the
treaty aside, this normalisation deal has perplexed the Moroccan
public because it introduced the idea that international recognition
of Western Sahara is a topic that is somehow connected to the Israel
Palestine conflict. This concept — created as an exchange by the
diplomatic leadership of the US, Morocco, and Israel — has left the
Moroccan public surprised that the fate of Morocco’s sovereignty
over Western Sahara could somehow be tied to their country’s
relationship with Israel. Rabat has responded to this by focusing on
the idea that this diplomatic deal is a landmark victory for claims
over Western Sahara, and that the sentiments of the public should
reflect that. While the positive benefits of this announcement for
Morocco’s claims to Western Sahara is, as previously stated, quite
clear, the idea of exchanging two fundamentally unrelated, yet very
public components of Morocco’s policy framework set an unusual
precedent, particularly with regards to regional stances on Israel.
The idea that foreign powers like the United States can orchestrate
deals between states in the MENA region based on their own goals
could lead to a harmful disconnect between their transactional-based
diplomacy and the reality of these ‘bargaining chips’ on the
ground. Of course, the consequences of this particular exchange
remain uncertain, but the potential implications of the United
States’ recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara
will be explored later in the policy outlook.
Culture and Diplomacy: Other factors in
the normalisation deal
In order to fully analyse the potential
implications of future Moroccan-Israeli relations, one must not only
understand the nature of their previous security partnership but also
their common cultural history. Prior to the creation of Israel in
1948, Morocco was home to the largest Jewish population in the MENA
region. In the 1940s, the Moroccan Jewish population made up roughly
10% of the total Moroccan population. Today, there are an estimated
one million Jews of Moroccan origin living in Israel and thousands of
Jews still living Morocco. Demographic connections between the two
states are supplemented by touristic, cultural, and business ones;
Moroccan and Israeli businesses have invested significant amounts of
money and energy into promoting cultural events in Morocco that aim
to foster connections between the Jewish Moroccan community and
Israel. Each year, up to 70,000 Israeli citizens visit Morocco for
vacation, despite the fact that there were no direct commercial
flights between the two countries until the recent normalisation
deal. Many of the tens of thousands of Israelis who visit Morocco
each year participate in heritage tourism. The Moroccan tourism
ministry has funded and supported this trend. In 2010, King Mohammed
VI announced a new initiative to restore Jewish cemeteries throughout
Morocco. In addition to cemeteries, synagogues, tombs of saints and
Rabbis, and historical Jewish quarters of cities (mellahs) have
received funding for renovation and tourism initiatives. In 2016, the
King also personally attended the rededication ceremony of the
Ettedgui Synagogue in Casablanca. Moreover, Casablanca is also home
to the Moroccan Jewish Museum, which was founded in 1997 and is the
only museum exclusively dedicated to Jewish culture and history in
the Islamic world. These trends in funding and the public appearances
of King Mohammed VI or his senior advisors — including Andre
Azoulay, an advisor to King Mohammed VI and member of the Moroccan
Jewish community — at these sites, shed light on Morocco’s
growing focus on the promotion of its Jewish heritage, and with it,
the future connections found from its diaspora in Israel.
Meanwhile, AFP reported on December
13th, three days after the normalisation announcement, that the
Moroccan school system would begin teaching about Jewish history and
culture. Serge Berdugo, the Secretary-General of the Council of
Jewish Communities of Morocco, explained how this decision is a first
for North Africa and reflects an effort from the Kingdom to integrate
its Jewish history into the national curriculum. This initiative
closely involved two US-based Jewish organisations, the American
Sephardi Federation (ASF) and the Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organisations (COP).
Moreover, the economic relationship
between the two states is growing. Between 2014 and 2017, for
example, Morocco and Israel participated in over $149 million worth
of trade. That classifies Morocco among the top four of Israel’s
trading partners in Africa. These cultural and economic connections,
in contrast to the aforementioned security one, have not existed in
secrecy. The Israeli and Moroccan leadership have often referenced
the cultural ties between the states, including in the recent
normalisation deal. In fact, this commonality has emerged as a
prominent rhetorical tool utilised particularly by the Moroccan
monarchy to explain the shift in official policy. This connection
differentiates the normalisation agreement between Israel and Morocco
from the three other states with which Israel also recently
established ties. However, the historical ties between Israel and the
Moroccan Jewish population have not been alluded to solely to justify
this deal, but rather, may be part of an overarching effort to paint
Morocco as a logical arbiter in the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
While Morocco’s security and cultural connections to Israel have
been outlined thus far in this paper, the Kingdom’s longstanding
connection to the Palestinian people and active role in the mediation
of the conflict should also be emphasised.
In addition to decades of officially
supporting the Palestinian people and leadership, Morocco has played
an active role on the international diplomatic stage as an advocate
for the Palestinian cause. For example, King Mohammed VI is the
Chairman of Al Quds Committee in the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation. The Al Quds Committee was organised to support the
Palestinian people, specifically in relation to rights over the holy
city of Jerusalem and the Al Aqsa Mosque. Thus, as Morocco and Israel
move forward in their relationship — despite the fact that the
details have yet to be finalised — questions will emerge with
regards to how the Kingdom will navigate its nuanced position, and if
it will use its unique relationship with both communities to centre
itself as a principal actor in any future resolutions. At the heart
of this decision is King Mohammed VI. As the public and practical
head of Morocco’s foreign policy, the King’s future actions will
shine light on if and how normalisation with Israel will impact the
future of Morocco’s role in the conflict. Yet, understandably,
there is no clear road map for operating within this new dynamic, and
so relevant parties will have to wait and see if the Kingdom’s
future actions confirm or dispute this intention.
Western Sahara
Morocco has claimed official
sovereignty over Western Sahara since Spanish colonial forces
withdrew from the territory in 1975. Following Spain’s exit from
the region, the Kingdom and the Frente Polisario (Polisario Front)
engaged in violent conflict over claims to the territory until a 1991
UN-brokered ceasefire that, at the time, also called for a referendum
within the territory. This official UN stance has since changed.
Today, Morocco has de facto control over about 75% of the territory
known as Western Sahara, with the remaining land largely a UN buffer
zone, which has been used by the Frente Polisario to mount attacks.
The United States’ recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the
entire territory marks a significant moment for the Kingdom for
several reasons. First, it officially supports the historical claims
the Kingdom has made over the territory, and with it, the promise of
future American diplomatic presence. Second, it offers a green light
for Morocco to further invest in the region and utiliae some of the
natural resources and economic potential that it has to offer.
Washington’s recognition of Morocco’s
claims to Western Sahara supports a major effort to advance Morocco’s
economic position in the region and throughout the world by becoming
an invaluable player in global trade. There is a strong foundation
for this role, prompted by both Morocco’s strategically
advantageous geographic location and the previous openness of the
Kingdom to global financial partnerships. For example, Tanger-Med
port, the creation of which was largely funded by Chinese investment,
is already the largest port in the Mediterranean and in Africa.
However, specific projects planned by the Kingdom stand to
specifically benefit from American diplomatic support, including a $1
billion effort to build the Dakhla port, which is located in Western
Sahara. The focus on investment in ports, particularly the latter,
emphasise the Kingdom’s push to build infrastructure around natural
resources, namely phosphate and shale gas, that are located in the
waters off the coast of Western Sahara. While the full extent of
these resources has, up until now, been relatively unexplored due to
the disputed claims over the territory, the United States’
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty could signal a future opening to
both exploration and investment.
However, the Kingdom’s development of
its ports is only one part of an overarching effort aimed at
attracting a diverse set of foreign investment, an effort that could
stand to benefit not only from Washington’s recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty over Western Sahara but also from Morocco’s
normalisation of ties with Israel. The latter-prompted investment
could stem largely from an increased global financial appetite,
particularly from GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states such as the
UAE and Bahrain, to invest in Morocco following their own
normalisation of ties with Israel. An almost symbolic example of
Morocco’s foreign investment profile comes from its al-Boraaq
high-speed rail. While Morocco contributed 27% of the financing for
the project itself, France offered 51% of the required funds, and the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait endowed the rest. The idea of
collective investment in key infrastructure projects throughout
Morocco reflects both the Kingdom’s openness to development
projects and the overwhelming outside interest in these endeavours.
However, from both an investor standpoint and a trade-route focus,
there are three main focuses of Moroccan foreign investment, all of
which stand to benefit from Washington’s recognition of Western
Sahara and the normalisation of ties with Israel.
The first and most advanced point of
investment is the West-African to Western Europe trade route. France
has provided the vast majority of foreign financing along with this
route, a reality reflective of the significant investment the country
has made in Morocco. This economic corridor is the most advanced and
well-funded in the region and a significant amount of its success,
according to a report published by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, stems
from the unique level of investment — both foreign and domestic —
in modern infrastructure, namely trains and ports. For example, the
Kingdom’s Rail Maroc 2040 initiative aims to update existing rail
infrastructure and build an additional 1,500km of rails across the
country. Projects like these are significantly more advanced in both
extent and funding that comparable plans in the region, a reality
that signals the extent of global interest in an Africa-to-Europe
industrial chain that heavily includes Morocco. However, these
investments are included within the parameters of this report because
they not only shed light on the Kingdom’s immediate investment
priorities but also showcase how this investment has notable
strategic implications. Included in the Rail Maroc 2040 plan is the
establishment of rail lines that connect Tangier to Lagouira, the
latter of which is located in the south of Western Sahara region.
Washington’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western
Sahara, therefore, can only stand to support Morocco’s development
goals. The public backing of the United States in advance of the
actual construction of this line could encourage further financial
support and diminish future public opposition to the project.
Second, as the example of al-Boraaq
high-speed rail indicates, GCC states have also turned their
attention to investment in Morocco. In recent years, several GCC
countries, including the United Arab Emirates, have ramped up
investment in North Africa. However, amid a variety of projects
across the region that could represent sound investments for the GCC
states’ goals, including ongoing development in Algeria and Egypt,
Morocco has drawn particular attention. One reason for this financial
focus in the past was the aforementioned favourable investment
conditions in Morocco given the advanced stage of these projects
relative to comparable nations. However, moving forward, the aligned
timing of the UAE and Bahrain’s establishment of formal economic
ties with Israel with Morocco’s own pivot to Israel could stand to
make the country a more appealing site of investment. In other words,
as certain states decide to normalise ties with Israel — a decision
heavily influenced by the United States — they form a growing group
of regional actors with similar financial and strategic goals.
Support from GCC states such as the UAE and Bahrain could aid the
infrastructural and financial development associated with the natural
resources located off of the Western Saharan coast in a globally
competitive manner.
Third, the financial benefits from
international recognition of Western Sahara, as well as the
normalisation of ties with Israel, assists Morocco in its efforts to
secure advantageous positioning with respect to the African
continent. Over the last few years, the Kingdom has made a public
shift towards involvement in African economic, diplomatic, and
cultural institutions. For example, in 2017 Morocco rejoined the
African Union. It is worthy to note that the Kingdom originally left
the African Union — or as it was called at the time, the
Organisation of African Unity — because the institution recognised
Western Sahara as an independent entity. As Morocco re-joins the
institution now, with the external backing of its claims to Western
Sahara from the United States, it may do so with the leverage of
being an active member in these circles in order to secure economic
and diplomatic advantages, while remaining confident that its
sovereignty over Western Sahara is supported by a powerful foreign
power. Moreover, Morocco is currently aiming to join the Economic
Community of West African States, an organisation headquartered in
Nigeria. Membership in organisations such as these, alongside the
potential future foreign investment outlined above, may position the
Kingdom not only as a regional player in Africa but as a political
and economic leader.
UN Action in Western Sahara
The 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire between
Morocco and the Frente Polisario initially called for a referendum in
Western Sahara to determine its future political status. However, in
the thirty years since the internationally mandated end to the
fighting, no referendum has taken place — as the Kingdom has
consistently expressed concerns over alleged inflation of the
reported number of refugees in the territory — with relatively few
external actors exerting substantive pressure to do so. In contrast—
as some Moroccan media and political outlets have suggested —
recent events may indicate that this official policy has changed, or
at the very least, been removed from the UN’s priorities.
In early November, the Frente Polisario
announced a formal end to the 1991 ceasefire after Moroccan troops
launched an operation towards the southern border of Western Sahara.
The incident sparked momentary concern of wide-spread or violent
escalation. Both the Moroccan government and Frente Polisario were
also incredibly quick to condemn the other and reiterate their
respective policies on the territory. However, one body that was
notably absent was the United Nations. Despite the fact this event
marked the termination of a major UN-brokered ceasefire, the UN
failed to offer any significant public reaction. Moreover, the United
Nations found itself once again notably silent following the
announcement of the United States’ recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty over the Western Saharan territory, an unquestionably
consequential policy shift. Sources in the Moroccan media have been
quick to notice this and have drawn attention to the UN’s silence
not as a moment of quiet negligence, but rather, as a resounding
statement in and of itself. While some analysts may feel that the
UN’s absence from recent events was a reflection of a deliberate
change in policy in favour of Morocco, others simply believe that the
silence reveals that the UN has settled into an acceptance of
Morocco’s de facto control over the territory.
This shift, of course, did not come out
of nowhere. As political analyst Samir Bennis noted in a piece for
Morocco World News, at several points in the past 30 years the UN
Security Council has passed updated resolutions that have clarified
the UN’s position on Western Sahara. The most recent resolution
pertaining to Western Sahara was actually adopted on October 30th,
2020. Resolution 2548, which officially contains the most updated UN
language on the situation, reaffirms support for past UNSC
resolutions. However, Resolution 2548 notably lacks explicit calls
for a referendum in Western Sahara, and instead favours a peaceful
and diplomatic solution that addresses the needs of all relevant
parties. While not a momentous shift in public attitude, these subtle
changes in the UN’s stance on Western Sahara — particularly at a
time when momentous events regarding the territory are occurring —
indicate a gradual inclination towards Morocco’s de facto
sovereignty over the territory in the long run.
Furthermore, regardless of the nuances
of official resolutions, it is important to highlight that the
reality on the ground in Western Sahara has favoured a de facto state
of Moroccan sovereignty with significant levels of autonomy. This is
where the United States re-enters into the discussion. While
President Trump is the first American President to publicise support
for total Moroccan sovereignty over the region, Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and Obama have all expressed varying degrees of support for
Morocco’s push to make Western Sahara a semi-autonomous region.
These policies were based on the growing belief that they represented
the most viable method for any UN-led peace process. Moroccan
policymakers, therefore, also grew to expect this pattern from US
policy and could act accordingly. This starting point —
supplemented by the negotiations described earlier in the policy
outlook and the sudden nature of President Trump’s change in
opinion — offers far greater insight into the motivations and
outcomes of the US policy on Western Sahara.
Of course, prior to the United States,
several governments outwardly supported Morocco’s claims to the
region. Yet, 8 POLICY OUTLOOK potentially of greater note are the
examples certain states’ quiet acceptance of Morocco’s
sovereignty over the territory as the de facto norm, and the
subsequent deals they have made with the Kingdom based on that
acceptance. In other words, over the years, several states have
launched economic ventures with Morocco that may contradict their
official stances on Western Sahara. In 2019 the European Parliament
officially consented to a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement
between Morocco and the EU. Included in the contents of the
partnership are waters off the coast of Western Sahara, coastline
previously deemed non-Moroccan waters. Many EU countries have
expressed opposition to Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in
the past, however, their most recent actions seem to suggest that the
economic benefits of supporting Morocco’s claims to the territory
and investing in a Moroccan Western Sahara far outweigh the benefits
of refuting its claims. The United States’ official endorsement of
Morocco’s sovereignty in Western Sahara, therefore, can only serve
to further Morocco’s claims to the territory and the silent
economic support that will come with it.
In contrast to the subtleties of the
positions of some of its European counterparts, France has been a
long-term ally and a major foreign investor in Morocco, a reality
drawn largely from the nation’s colonial past. While France does
not officially endorse Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara,
it has significantly contributed to long-term projects — including
the Kingdom’s train line that they hope to build through Western
Sahara — that acquiesce Morocco’s de facto control over the
territory. These investments have a long historical precedent. For
example, during the 1975 Western Sahara War, France officially
remained neutral but covertly supplied Morocco with large arms
shipments.1 At the time, this support for the Kingdom was far from a
well-kept secret; outside parties knew that France clearly favoured
Moroccan forces over the Algerian-backed Sahrawi forces. France
backtracked on this favouritism in the following years over increased
financially motivated interests in forming closer relations with
Algeria. However, the country’s stance on Western Sahara has waxed
and waned in accordance with its relations with both of the formerly
colonised states. Today, France claims neutrality on the matter, but,
like the United States, has also been a proponent of Morocco’s
proposal for autonomy in the region. Thus, the greatest evidence of
its stance can be drawn from investments in the area and its deep
stakes in a number of significant projects — including ones that
take place in Western Sahara — that promise to bring Morocco to the
forefront of regional development.
Conclusion
Washington’s announcement that it
would publicly back Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara sent
waves through the international diplomatic community. This policy
shift, a product of years of covert diplomacy, was to be exchanged
for Morocco’s normalisation of ties with Israel. This quid pro quo,
a signature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach,
has far-reaching consequences that will continue to unfold in Israel,
Palestine, Morocco, and throughout the MENA region. However, as
Morocco now wields a strong international backer in its claims to
Western Sahara, a new $1 billion arms deal, and the promise of future
economic cooperation with a number of countries, including France,
the UAE, and Israel itself, the Kingdom has undoubtedly secured a
major victory. Yet, the formal normalisation of ties also raises
questions with regards to Morocco’s future role in relation to
Israel and the Palestinians, a conflict that the Kingdom has played
an active role in for decades. While many facets of Morocco’s
political and economic future look bright, it will have to carefully
navigate its newfound position with respect to Palestine and the
Palestinian people it has publicly supported for so long. Thus, much
remains to be worked out in the nuances of the new Morocco-Israel
relationship, the consequences of which will likely influence the
future proliferation of normalisation throughout the MENA region.
